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first federal savings bank of boston andover ma

First Federal Savings Bank of Boston is premier mortgage specialist in Andover, MA. If you are looking for mortgage rates, learn about buying a house, or. First Federal Savings Bank of Lincolnton, Lincolnton, NC, mynewextsetup.us Eastern Bank, Boston, MA, mynewextsetup.us · First National Bank of Steeleville. One of the fastest growing credit unions in Massachusetts. Auto loans, Home Equity Lines, Mortgages, Visa Credit Card, Personal Loans, low rates.

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First federal savings bank of boston andover ma

Randolph Savings to Buy First Federal Savings of Boston

Randolph Savings Bank in Massachusetts has agreed to buy First Eastern Bankshares in Andover, Mass.

The $ million-asset Randolph Savings did not disclose financial terms for the deal, which is expected to close by early

First Eastern is the holding company for the $73 million-asset First Federal Savings Bank of Boston and First Eastern Mortgage. James McDonough, Randolph Savings' chief executive, said in a press release that it is interested in First Eastern, in part, because of its mortgage business.

"A key component of our growth strategy has been investment in our residential lending division," McDonough said.

First Eastern Mortgage has eight mortgage-loan production offices in eastern Massachusetts and services $ million of mortgage loans. After the deal closes, Randolph Savings' said it expects to originate more than $ million yearly in residential mortgage loans.

Peter Fraser, First Eastern's president, will lead Randolph's residential division after the acquisition closes.

First Federal Savings Bank has a branch in Andover.

Randolph Savings Bank, a unit of Randolph Bancorp in Stoughton, Mass., has six branches.

Источник: mynewextsetup.us

ANDOVER SAVINGS BANK & others vs. COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE (and a companion case ).

ANDOVER SAVINGS BANK & others [Note 1] vs. COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE (and a companion case [Note 2]).

Mass.

May 6, - August 25,

Suffolk County

Present: HENNESSEY, C.J., WILKINS, NOLAN, LYNCH, & O'CONNOR, JJ.

An action by representative savings banks and cooperative banks, seeking a declaration that the bank excise tax imposed by G. L. c. 63, Section 11, is unconstitutional and illegally applied, raised important public questions and was appropriate for treatment by a court notwithstanding the plaintiffs' failure to exhaust their administrative remedies. [] The income-based portion of the bank excise tax imposed by G. L. c. 63, Section 11 (a) (1) and (b) (1), meets the test of reasonableness prescribed by the Credit score needed for bank of america credit card Constitution. []

Amounts paid by savings banks and cooperative banks to their depositors, including those holding certificates of deposit, were properly treated by the Commissioner of Revenue as being analogous to dividends, rather than operating expenses, and thus such amounts were not deductible from gross income for purposes of calculating the income portion of the bank excise tax imposed by G. L. c. 63, Section []

The Commissioner of Revenue did not err in continuing to apply the deposits portion of the bank excise tax to State-chartered mutual savings banks and cooperative banks, following a Federal Circuit Court decision that this aspect of the tax, as applied to Federal savings and loan associations, violated Federal law, where it was clear that the Legislature intended to continue to tax State-chartered institutions. []

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State-chartered savings banks and cooperative banks were not denied their constitutional right to equal protection of the laws by reason of the fact that the deposits portion of the bank excise tax established by G. L. c. 63, Section 11, continued to be imposed upon them following a Federal Circuit Court decision that Federal law did not permit imposition of that portion of the tax on Federal savings and loan associations. []

In an action seeking relief from the bank excise tax imposed by G. L. c. 63, Section 11, there was no merit in the contention that cooperative banks were denied equal protection of the laws because they were taxed differently from State-chartered commercial banks. []

Part II, c. 1, Section 1, art. 4, of the Massachusetts Constitution did not require excise taxes to be proportional in their effect on mutual banks and State-chartered commercial banks, as the respective privileges of the two classes of banks are different in character. []

Provisions of G. L. c. 63, Section 11, which place a geographical limitation on mortgage loans which qualify for a deduction in calculating the deposits portion of the bank excise tax, did not impermissibly discriminate against interstate commerce, in view of circumstances that the statutory intent was merely to avoid double taxation of real estate, that the resulting burden on out-of-State borrowers was speculative and insubstantial, that banking activities are of "profound local concern," and that Congress has recognized the validity of geographical restrictions imposed by States upon mutual banks. []

CIVIL ACTIONS commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on December 18,

The cases were reported by Liacos, J.

Laurence H. Tribe (Kenneth A. Cohen with him) for Andover Savings Bank & others.

Stanley V. Ragalevsky (Karen J. Bloom with him) for Stoneham Co-operative Bank & another.

Stephen S. Ostrach, Assistant Attorney General (Charles E. Walker, Assistant Attorney General, with him) for Commissioner of Revenue.

Donald J. Barry, Jr., for Massachusetts Mortgage Bankers Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Peter W. Coogan & Scott C. Moriearty, for Mutual Savings Central Fund, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Theodore C. Landsmark, for Massachusetts Urban Reinvestment Advisory Group, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

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Thomas A. Brooks, F. Douglas Birdzell, W. Randolph Torres & Thomas W. Lawless, Jr., for Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Richard A. Manley, for Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

HENNESSEY, C.J. In this consolidated action filed in the county court, the plaintiffs, who are six savings banks, a savings banks association, and two cooperative banks, seek to have this court declare that the bank excise tax levied by G. L. c. 63, Section 11, [Note 3] is unconstitutional and also illegally applied by the Commissioner of Revenue. [Note 4] See G. L. c. A.

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The case is before us on reservation and report by a single justice of this court, with an accompanying statement of agreed facts. [Note 5] The plaintiffs make four claims: (1) that the excise is unreasonable and therefore in violation of Part II, c. 1, Section 1, art. 4, of the Massachusetts Constitution; (2) that the Commissioner has incorrectly interpreted G. L. c. 63, Section 11, so as to forbid the plaintiff banks to deduct as an "operating expense" the dividends or interest paid to depositors; (3) that Section 11 is being discriminatorily applied contrary to the Massachusetts Constitution and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (4) that one aspect of Section 11 impermissibly interferes with interstate commerce, and is therefore contrary to art. I, Section 8, of the Constitution of the United States. We conclude that each of these claims is without merit and hold that the excise is constitutional.

1. As a preliminary matter, we note that the defendant does not argue that, because the plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before the Appellate Tax Board, a declaratory judgment should be denied in this case. Where the Legislature has provided an administrative procedure for resolving certain types of controversies, the "requirement of exhaustion will be suspended only when the facts of a particular case raise important public questions whose resolution concerns or will affect more persons than the parties to the case." East Chop Tennis Club v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, Mass.(). We agree that this case involves issues of law that affect every thrift institution chartered under the laws of this Commonwealth, and that this case is therefore an appropriate one with which to deal in a declaratory proceeding.

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See First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, Mass.(), aff'd, U.S. (). [Note 6]

2. The Constitution of the Commonwealth authorizes the General Court to impose "reasonable" excises on the privilege of transacting business as a corporation. Part II, c. 1, Section 1, art. 4. See S.S. White Dental Mfg. Co. v. Commonwealth, Mass. 3538 () (constitutional reference to "commodities" includes the privilege of transacting business as a corporation), aff'd, U.S. 68 (). See also Commissioner of Revenue v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., Mass.(). The cooperative banks [Note 7] broadly attack G. L. c. 63, Section 11, as unreasonable and therefore in violation of that constitutional limit first federal savings bank of boston andover ma the legislative power. They do not appear to argue that the deposits portion of the excise, Section 11 (a) (2) & (b) (2), is unreasonable, nor could they well do so in light of the well-reasoned decision upholding that aspect of the tax in Commonwealth v. People's Five Cents Sav. Bank, 5 Allen (). See Provident Inst. v. Massachusetts, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) (), affirming Commonwealth v. Provident Inst. for Sav., 12 Allen (). Rather, the thrust of their argument is that the income-based portion of the excise tax, Section 11 (a) (1) & (b) (1), is unreasonable as interpreted and applied by the Commissioner because it does not fairly measure the present existing value of the franchises of the banks. They point cheapoair customer service outside us that while the pretax profits of the banks have in recent years decreased, the amount of taxes assessed under Section 11 has increased. In particular, it is argued that amounts paid as interest to depositors constitute a "cost" of doing business and therefore must be deducted from "net operating income" if the excise is to measure accurately the value of the privilege of conducting business as a corporation.

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The parties agree that the thrift industry in Massachusetts is currently experiencing severe financial difficulties. A major factor has been the rise of interest rates in recent years. It appears that, during the 's and 's, thrift institutions (also referred to as "mutual" institutions) invested their funds mostly in long-term, fixed-rate real estate loans at interest rates which, by today's standards, are relatively low. According to the agreed statement of facts, depositors at that time put their money primarily into regular savings accounts which yielded returns of approximately 4 1/2% to 5 1/2%. Because the banks were able to get average returns on their loans at higher rates than were paid to the depositors, they were able to operate on a sound financial basis. As interest rates rose in the late 's, however, these banks were forced to pay higher rates in order to continue attracting depositors. Many depositors withdrew their money from regular savings accounts and purchased term certificates of deposit which yielded returns at higher rates of 13% to 16%. The banks' investments in outstanding long-term loans have continued to yield returns at the relatively lower interest rates existing at the time they were made. Although total investment returns have increased in recent years, they have not kept up with the sharp increase in funds paid to depositors. Several of the plaintiffs have been unable in the last two years to earn sufficient income to cover the amount of these funds and overhead expenses.

The plaintiffs assert that this situation has been exacerbated by the Commissioner's interpretation of G. L. c. 63, Section Section 11, in addition to imposing a tax on deposits, also levies a tax on "net operating income" defined as gross income for the taxable year, less "operating expenses" and other deductions not relevant to this case. The Commissioner interprets "operating expenses" as not encompassing amounts paid to depositors in the form of interest or dividends. Without the deduction for amounts paid to depositors, the taxes assessed on the banks under Section 11 have generally increased even though the banks have been experiencing significantly lower earnings, and even losses.

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In addressing a constitutional challenge to a tax measure, we begin with the premise that the tax is endowed with a presumption of validity and is not to be found void unless its invalidity is established beyond a rational doubt. Eaton, Crane & Pike Co. v. Commonwealth, Mass.(). Commonwealth v. People's Five Walmart eye center mexico mo Sav. Bank, supra at See Johnson v. Martignetti, Mass.(). The Legislature is empowered to impose a reasonable excise on any franchise or privilege conferred by the Commonwealth. The limitation that an excise be "reasonable" was first federal savings bank of boston andover ma intended to give to the judiciary the right to revise decisions of the Legislature that might be thought unwise or inexpedient. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, Mass.(). Nevertheless, the Legislature may not impose an excise tax which is based upon "false and unjust principles," Commonwealth v. People's Five Cents Sav. Bank, supra ator which exacts assessments that are "grossly oppressive or contrary to common right," American Uniform Co. v. Commonwealth, Mass. 4245 (), or which does not "show a proper proportion between the benefits received and the sum paid for the enjoyment of them," Suffolk Sav. Bank for Seamen, petitioner, Mass.().

These principles cannot be applied in a vacuum. The constitutionality of an excise must be judged in relation to the nature of the entity upon which it is imposed. Mutual banking institutions, which consist of savings banks, cooperative banks, and savings and loan associations, are nonprofit organizations established solely for the benefit of their depositors. Their original purpose was to encourage thrift and also to afford a method by which the profits and advantages arising from the use of large amounts of money could be enjoyed by persons of moderate means. Commonwealth v. People's Five Cents Sav. Bank, supra at Bank of Redemption v. Boston, U.S. 60, 68 (). In addition, they were "designed to make it easier for a person to borrow money to build, buy or repair a home and to make available a certain amount of capital for government and

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public enterprise securities." Report of the Special Commission on Taxation, House Doc. No.at This public purpose remains unchanged today. Unlike commercial banks (which consist of national banks, trust companies, and banking companies), mutual institutions are not owned by stockholders who have invested in the stock of the bank. Instead, savings banks are "owned" by their depositors, and cooperative banks and savings and loan associations are "owned" by member shareholders. Id. See generally G. L. c. (savings banks); G. L. c. (cooperative banks); 12 U.S.C. Section ( & Supp. IV ) (Federal savings and loan associations). See also Dunham v. Ware Sav. Bank, Mass. 63 first federal savings bank of boston andover ma, 73 ().

In determining whether the excise imposed by Section 11 fairly measures the value of the franchise, the plaintiffs would have this court think of "value" as something akin to what might be produced if a particular mutual bank were sold to private buyers. But the value of transacting business as a savings bank or cooperative bank lies not in any surplus that may be accumulated, but rather in the benefits that are enjoyed by the depositors and borrowers. See Commonwealth v. People's Five Cents Sav. Bank, 5 Allen(). We have no doubt that, viewed in this light, the income-based portion of the excise is reasonable. It is not a type of corporate income tax. It measures the value of the bank's investment function according to the returns that are realized for the benefit of its depositors. This is at least as reasonable a measure of the privilege as is the deposits tax, which measures the bank's investment function according to the total deposits available for investment. Greater precision in measuring the value of the privilege is not constitutionally required. Commissioner of Revenue v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., Mass.(). Springfield Ins. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, Mass.().

3. The plaintiffs contend that the Commissioner has incorrectly interpreted Section 11 by first federal savings bank of boston andover ma to permit the plaintiffs to deduct, as "operating expenses," interest or dividends

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paid to depositors. It is argued that the obligation of a savings bank or cooperative bank to its depositors constitutes a debt, and that any periodic payment to depositors should be equated with the payment of interest to a creditor, and thus represents an operating expense. We addressed a similar question in the context of federally-chartered savings and loan associations in First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, Mass.(), aff'd, U.S. (), and upheld the Commissioner's position. The court concluded that the relationship between a Federal savings and loan association and its members is more like an ownership status than a debtor-creditor relationship, and that therefore any convert pinterest to business account is more analogous to a dividend than a payment of interest.

What we said earlier in this case dispose of the plaintiffs' contention that First Federal is distinguishable. The fact that the depositors of savings banks and cooperative banks do not share some of the attributes of ownership discussed in First Federal, supra atdoes not alter the essential relationship that exists between these mutual banks and their depositors. In the case of savings banks, the earnings may be distributed to the depositors, G. L. c.Sections B, and any undivided profits are credited to surplus accounts "to meet losses, contingencies and adjustments arising out of or incidental to the operation of chase loans personal loans bank's] business." G. L. c.Section 57, as appearing in St.c.Section 6. Accumulated surplus is held in reserve for the benefit of the depositors. Dunham v. Ware Sav. Bank, Mass. 6373 (). If a savings bank is voluntarily dissolved, the debts of the bank are satisfied first, after which the remaining proceeds are distributed among the depositors. G. L. c.Section 71 (2), (4). These provisions are consistent with an ownership status. Cooperative banks are similar in many respects. See G. L. c.Sections 31, 37, 37A, 38, 40; St.c. 73, Sectionsas amended (Mass. Ann. Laws c. App. []). We recognize that, in practice, these features of the relationship between depositor and bank are of little significance to the average depositor. Government regulation of

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the banking industry affects the rates that may be paid to depositors, and insures depositors against the risks of bank failure. Nevertheless, such regulation does not alter the essential purpose for which mutual banks are established. For certain other purposes it may be more convenient to view the relationship between depositor and bank as that of debtor-creditor. Cf. Carpenter v. Suffolk Franklin Sav. Bank, Mass.(); Laighton v. Brookline Trust Co., Mass. (); Atwood v. Dumas, Mass. (). For tax purposes, however, we think that there is ample support for the Commissioner's position that payments made to depositors are analogous to dividends and thus not deductible as "operating expenses." See Dunham v. Ware Sav. Bank, supra at 73; Lewis v. Lynn Inst. for Sav., Mass. (); Commonwealth v. People's Five Cents Sav. Bank, 5 Allen ().

The plaintiffs also argue that holders of certificates of deposit more clearly have debt rather than equity relationships with the banks. In support of this contention, they observe that the certificate of deposit relationship is regulated by a written agreement, and that the rate at which payments are to be made to the holder is fixed in advance by the agreement. These superficial similarities to a debtor-creditor relationship, however, should not be permitted to disguise or alter what has already been said about the nature and purpose of mutual banks. It must be kept in mind that the excise imposed by Section 11 -- both the deposits-based portion and the income-based portion -- is intended to tax that function of mutual banks which works to the benefit of those who enjoy the banks' privileges. One measure of that function is the amount of investment returns distributed to those who invest their savings in the business of these banks. In order for the excise to be faithful to this purpose, it must be levied upon the returns payable to all investors, including holders of certificates of deposit. Even if we accept that the words "operating expenses" are ambiguous, the Commissioner's long-standing interpretation of this phrase, including her conclusion that holders of certificates

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of deposit are to be treated the same as all other depositors, "is entitled to some weight in resolving the statutory ambiguity." First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, Mass.(). See Metropolitan Property & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., Mass.(); Rockland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., Mass.(). We think, therefore, that the Commissioner has not exceeded her authority in refusing to allow a deduction for payments made to holders of certificates of deposit.

4. We next consider the plaintiffs' argument that the Commissioner has erred in applying the deposits portion of the excise to the State-chartered mutual institutions but not to Federal savings and loan associations. Prior toSection 11 did not impose any tax on Federal savings and loan associations. Statutec. 14, Section 11, rewrote G. L. c. 63, Section 11, to make it applicable to all mutual banks located in Massachusetts, including Federal savings and loan associations, and also to increase the taxes payable by the banks. [Note 8] Inhowever, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in United States v. State Tax Comm'n, F.2d (1st Cir. ), held that the deposits aspect of Section 11, as applied to Federal savings and loan associations, violated 12 U.S.C. Section (h) (), and was therefore invalid to that extent. [Note 9] Since the First Circuit decision, those

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Federal associations have not paid the deposits-based measure of the tax, but have paid only the net operating income measure of the excise tax. The Commissioner has continued to impose the deposits-based portion of the excise tax on Massachusetts savings banks and cooperative banks.

The plaintiffs first argue that the primary purpose of Section 11 is to tax Federal and State institutions equally, and that the Commissioner's application of the deposits tax to the plaintiffs and not to Federal savings and loan associations is therefore contrary to the legislative intent and constitutes an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative function. It cannot be doubted that equality of treatment was intended when the Legislature enacted St.mills v board of education of the district of columbia. 14, Section It may even be argued that the primary purpose of the amendment to G. L. c. 63, Section 11, was to equalize the tax treatment of Federal savings and loan associations and State mutual banks (although this is open to substantial doubt). However, we think it unrealistic to conclude that G. L. c. 63, Section 11, taken as a whole, has as its primary object the equal treatment of Federal and State banks. Common sense indicates that, unless it clearly appears to the contrary, the foremost purpose of a tax measure is to raise revenues. In these circumstances, we do not believe that the Legislature, had it been faced with the question, would have wanted the deposits tax to be entirely voided rather than to be applied only to State banks.

Our conclusion on this point is reinforced by the fact that, two years after the decision in United States v. State Tax Comm'n, supra, the Legislature enacted St.c.Section 44, which struck out Section 11 and inserted identical language, except for increases made in the rates of the excise. This reenactment of Section 11 manifests a legislative intent to continue taxing the State banks. "[W]hen the same legislature, in

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a later statute, use the terms of an earlier one which has received a judicial construction, that construction is to be given to the later statute. . For if it were intended to exclude any known construction of a previous statute, the legal presumption is, that its terms would be so changed as to effect that intention." Matter of Jones, Mass.(), quoting from Commonwealth v. Hartnett, 3 Gray(). See Lorillard v. Pons, U.S.(). Although this case does not involve a judicial "construction" of a statute, but rather a judicial modification dictated by constitutional law, the principle is the same. The Legislature is presumed to be aware of any effects that a judicial decision may have on the operation of a statute. Given the direct impact that the Federal court decision in United States v. State Tax Comm'n had on State revenues, it is unlikely that the Legislature was ignorant of the decision or of the Commissioner's response to it. Surely the Legislature would not have reenacted the tax if it had intended that State banks also be exempted from its provisions. The logical conclusion is that the Legislature in intended that Section 11 remain in effect as to State-chartered banks, but at the higher rates set by the law.

The plaintiffs make the further argument that the failure to tax State-chartered mutual banks and Federal savings and loan associations alike violated the plaintiffs' right to equal protection of the laws. It is asserted that the business of Federal savings and loan associations is substantially similar to that of savings banks and cooperative banks incorporated in this Commonwealth, see Springfield Inst. for Sav. v. Worcester Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, Mass., cert. denied, U.S. (); Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation v. Flaherty, Mass. (), cert. denied, U.S. (), and that the classification made by the Commissioner's application of the statute is without any rational basis. We disagree.

When economic regulation is challenged as a violation of the equal protection clause, the traditional inquiry is "whether

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the classification involved rationally furthers a legitimate State interest." Blue Hills Cemetery, Inc. v. Board of Registration in Embalming & Funeral Directing, Mass.(), quoting from Johnson v. Martignetti, Mass.(). The banks argue that, since Massachusetts has no legitimate purpose in classifying Federal savings and loan associations and State-chartered banks differently, the tax must be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, Mass. (); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Director of the Div. on the Necessaries of Life, Mass. (). However, we believe that the traditional equal protection analysis is not entirely applicable where the classification that is made is between an entity of the State, and an agency or instrumentality of the Federal government. The Federal structure of our national government itself implies that a State may draw a distinction between its own entities and similar Federal agencies or instrumentalities for no other reason than that they are the creations of the different sovereigns; provided, of course, that the classification does not first convenience bank at walmart afoul of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.

Whether or not this is true as a general principle, there is no doubt that it is true with respect to State taxation of banks. In Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Phelps, U.S. (), a case similar to this one, the United States Supreme Court held that Alabama did not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by taxing the shares of certain State commercial banks but not the shares of national banks. The Court observed that a State has no power to tax a federally-chartered bank unless expressly authorized by Congress. Id. atand cases cited. See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) (). The Court then stated: "This is enough to negative the idea that shares of National and State banks are essentially the same for purposes of taxation. . [National banks] are of a class wholly distinct from the property of ordinary corporations or individuals, union savings bank mt washington this fact cannot be disregarded by

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the State. If the State sees fit to tax unrestricted property within her jurisdiction and to omit National Bank shares, the classification cannot be said to be arbitrary and wholly unreasonable -- the basis of it is plain enough. It may be vastly more important for the State to omit National Bank shares and tax ordinary moneyed capital according to a plan not permissible in respect of National Bank shares rather than conform to the standard prescribed by Congress. There is nothing to indicate that Congress ever supposed that mere establishment of a National Bank within a State could upset the scheme for taxation, theretofore entirely proper, by producing conflict with the XIV Amendment. This view would subject the taxing power of the State to the will of Congress far beyond what is necessary for the protection of federal agencies." Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Phelps, supra at

It is argued that the constitutional underpinnings of Phelps have been eroded by more recent decisions which suggest that the Federal principles espoused in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) (), no longer require that national banks be immune from State taxation. See First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, Mass.(), reversed on other grounds, U.S. (); United States v. New Mexico, U.S. (). It is undisputed, however, that by virtue of the supremacy clause State taxation of national banks is prohibited unless congressionally authorized. First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, U.S. (). Whether the immunity of national banks from State taxation is derived from the supremacy clause or from broader principles of federalism implicit in the Federal Constitution, the language of the Phelps case is equally applicable. The classification made by Congress is endowed with constitutional validity, and thus carries with it the necessary implication that the States may make the same

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classification. [Note 10] The same reasoning holds true under our State Constitution.

The cooperative banks make a similar argument that their right to equal protection of the laws has been violated because mutual banks are taxed differently from State-chartered commercial banks. [Note 11] The contention clearly is without merit. Mutual banks and commercial banks are different in their organizational structure and purpose, and they have been subject to different methods of taxation for over years. Report of the Special Commission on Taxation, House Doc. No.atThe Legislature could reasonably conclude that these differences warrant different tax treatment. Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Phelps, supra at Bank of Redemption v. Boston, U.S. 60, ().

There is also a suggestion by the cooperative banks that under our State Constitution, Part II, c. 1, Section 1, art. 4, an excise must be proportional in its effect on mutual banks and commercial banks. This argument is also without merit. Although an excise tax "must operate alike on all persons who exercise a particular employment or enjoy the same privilege or commodity," Oliver v. Washington Mills,11

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Allen(), the principle does not apply where, as in the case of republic bank trinidad online banking login banks and commercial banks, the privilege enjoyed is of a different character. That these privileges are different has already been demonstrated.

5. We turn next to the contention that one aspect of the deposits tax constitutes an impermissible discrimination against interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause, art. 1, Section 8, cl. 3 of the United States Constitution. Section 11 allows a bank, in computing the tax, to deduct from taxable deposits "the unpaid balance on its loans secured by the mortgage of real estate taxable in this commonwealth, or real estate situated in a state contiguous to the commonwealth, and within a radius of fifty miles of the main office of such bank or association." The banks assert that by setting first federal savings bank of boston andover ma geographical limitation on mortgage loans which qualify for the deduction, the deposits tax discourages mutual banks from lending money in other States, thereby discriminating against interstate commerce.

Although the purpose of the deduction at issue here is not necessarily controlling in deciding whether there is a violation of the commerce clause, see Philadelphia v. New Jersey, U.S.(), we note that the avowed statutory intent is to avoid double taxation of real estate, property owners being subject to local real estate taxation. [Note 12] Originally, the deduction applied only to loans made in Massachusetts, because the State's mutual banks had no power to make loans outside the State. The deduction has never been accurately attuned to its purpose. [Note 13] In

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the savings banks were permitted to make loans in contiguous States upon real estate located within twenty-five miles of a bank's main office. St.c.Section 1. The geographical limit was extended to fifty miles by St.c.Section 1 (amending G. L. c.Section 34, par. 2). Cooperative banks were permitted in to make contiguous-States loans within twenty-five miles, St.c.Section 1 (amending G. L. c.Section 23), and in the limit was extended to fifty miles. St.c. The deduction, however, was not extended to the present fifty-mile limit until See St.c. 14, Sections 11, Even then the deduction was not made available with respect to certain loans that were permitted beyond the geographical limits, youtube video embed responsive code, real estate loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration or the Veterans' Administration. See G. L. c.Section 35, par. 11, as appearing in St.c.Section 1 (savings banks); G. L. c.Section 24A, inserted by St.c. (cooperative banks). Although the deduction has remained the same sincethe geographical limitations on loans made by savings banks have been further relaxed in recent years. See G. L. c.Section 35, par. 11, as appearing in St.c.Section 2. [Note 14]

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We assume for the purposes of this case that G. L. c. 63, Section 11, discourages mutual banks from investing in mortgage loans outside the fifty-mile limit. If we were to accept the banks' reasoning that a State may not discourage mutual banks incorporated under its laws from investing in such loans, then surely it would follow that a State may not prohibit such investments altogether. Yet historically, State banks have never had the right to exercise their corporate powers outside of their home State unless expressly authorized by law. See 4 Michie, Banks and Banking c. 7, Section 3 (). See also Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)(). Geographical restrictions of the type citi credit card online by Massachusetts are common among the eastern States, see Encyclopedia of Banking Laws (H. Bailey, ed. ), and undoubtedly have existed since the early days of the mutual banking industry. Although the banks do not expressly so argue, their reasoning amounts essentially to a claim that all such geographical restrictions are invalid as a violation of the commerce clause.

We disagree that Section 11, as well as the other geographical restrictions placed on Massachusetts mutual institutions, allied savings bank contact number the type of "simple economic protectionism" that evokes "a virtually per se rule of invalidity" under the commerce clause. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, U.S.(). It is true that the restrictions discriminate between mortgage loans made within Massachusetts and those made outside the State and beyond the fifty-mile limit. Nevertheless, we do not think that they fall within that class of cases relied on by the plaintiffs. The cases bank of america fees for business checking account by the banks can be categorized as holding either (1) that a State may not block the flow of natural resources or products of trade from one State to another in order to satisfy local needs, e.g., New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, U.S. (); Hughes v. Oklahoma, U.S. (); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, U.S. (), or (2) that a State may not impose a greater burden on out-of-State businesses to the direct advantage of local interests, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, U.S. ();

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Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., U.S. 27 (); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, U.S. (); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, U.S. ().

We first reject any suggestion that Massachusetts is blocking the flow of its natural resources or products of trade to other States. If the flow of anything is being inhibited, it is money that would otherwise be destined for out-of-State borrowers. Money is a medium of exchange and not a natural resource or product of trade. Moreover, there is no general interference with the interstate flow of money. Compare Hughes v. Oklahoma, U.S. () (holding invalid a State law prohibiting the export for sale of natural minnows procured within the State). Here, only one means of exchange out of countless others is being restricted.

Nor do we find applicable those cases invalidating State laws which effect "simple economic protectionism." Philadelphia v. New Jersey, U.S.(). If the deposits tax favors local interests at the expense of out-of-State interests, it does so only by discouraging certain out-of-State borrowers from doing business with Massachusetts mutual banks on a fully competitive basis. (Certainly foreign banks are not burdened by the operation of the tax.) Any such burden on out-of-State borrowers, we think, is too speculative to evoke the prohibitions of the commerce clause. The deposits tax is only one-sixteenth of one percent of the average amount of a bank's deposits. We cannot assume that this will significantly discourage Massachusetts mutual banks from competing in other States, or that any such decline in competition would necessarily affect the availability or price of real estate mortgages. It is just as likely that foreign banking institutions fully compensate for any lack of competition engendered by Massachusetts' regulatory policies.

But even if we were to assume that the tax has a meaningful impact on the market for real estate loans in other States, it would not follow that it is invalid. We think that a State may create a certain class of corporations and limit their activities

Page

to intrastate transactions without violating the commerce clause. There is no inherent right to conduct business as a corporation. It is a privilege which may be granted or withheld by the State, and may be made subject to such terms and restrictions as the State deems appropriate. So long as no significant discriminatory burden is placed on foreign businesses in their conduct of interstate trade, and so long as the interstate flow of natural resources or products of trade is not obstructed, we think that a State may restrict a class of domestic corporations to the transacting of intrastate business in order to ensure that the citizens of the State will be the primary beneficiaries of the grant of the privilege. Banking activities are "of profound local concern," Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., U.S. 27, 38 (), and the impact of the challenged tax law is not " `parochial' in the sense that it overtly prevents foreign enterprises from competing in local markets." Id. at

We also observe that Congress itself has recognized the validity of geographical restrictions imposed on mutual banks. There is of course no doubt that Congress has the power to "permit the states to regulate the commerce in a manner which would otherwise not be permissible." Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, U.S.(). The Home Owners' Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. Sections ( & Supp. IV ), which authorizes the organization of Federal savings and loan associations, provides that "[a]n association which was formerly organized as a savings bank under State law shall be subject to the requirements of State law. . pertaining to discrimination in the extension of home mortgage loans or adjustment in the terms of mortgage instruments based on neighborhood or geographical area. . if the [Federal Home Loan Bank] Board determines that State law and regulations impose more stringent requirements than Federal law and regulations." 12 U.S.C. Section (a)(1) (Supp. IV ). It is unlikely that Congress would have required that banks be subject to State geographical limitations unless it considered such restrictions to be valid. It is also noteworthy that Massachusetts'

Page

regulatory policy is consistent with a similar congressional policy expressed in the Community Reinvestment Act of12 U.S.C. Sections (Supp. IV ). The act directs "each appropriate Federal financial supervisory agency to use its authority when examining [regulated] financial institutions, to encourage such institutions to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered." 12 U.S.C. Section (b). Federal banking authorities have issued regulations in furtherance of this purpose. See 12 C.F.R. Section 25 (), 12 C.F.R. Section (), and 12 C.F.R. Section (). In addition, Federal savings and loan associations are also restricted to making commercial, corporate, and business loans only "within the State where the bank is located or within 75 miles of the bank's home office." 12 U.S.C. Section (a)(2)(B) (Supp. IV ). These Federal laws exhibit an understanding first federal savings bank of boston andover ma the part of Congress that geographical restrictions of the sort imposed by Massachusetts are valid and even desirable regulatory policy.

In sum, we conclude that Section 11 does not impermissibly discriminate against interstate commerce. The commerce clause was intended to create "an area of trade free from interference by the States." Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, U.S.(), quoting from Freeman v. Hewit, U.S.(). It was not intended, we think, to preclude the States from placing geographical restrictions on the activities of domestically-chartered mutual banking institutions.

6. We conclude our discussion by stating generally that, if the plaintiffs are to get relief from fiscal difficulties in what are concededly hard economic times, they should seek that relief from the Legislature. It is not within the province of this court to invalidate a tax merely because it has come to seem burdensome in recent years due to changed economic conditions. Banking is a heavily regulated industry, and the ills that now beset thrift institutions appear to be the result of a complex array of regulatory and economic

Page

factors. If a cure is to be had for these ills, it should be accomplished by first federal savings bank of boston andover ma action.

Judgment is to be entered denying injunctive relief and declaring that G. L. c. 63, Section 11, is constitutional as applied to the plaintiffs, and that the Commissioner has not exceeded her authority in construing "operating expenses" not to include payments made in the form of interest or dividends to depositors or holders of certificates of deposit.

So ordered.

FOOTNOTES

[Note 1] First American First federal savings bank of boston andover ma for Savings, Home Savings Bank, Mutual Bank for Savings, The Provident Institution for Savings in the Town of Boston, Worcester County Institution for Savings, and Savings Banks Association of Massachusetts.

[Note 2] Stoneham Co-operative Bank & another vs. Commissioner of Revenue. The other plaintiff is the Haverhill Co-operative First federal savings bank of boston andover ma.

[Note 3] General Laws c. 63, Section 11, as appearing in St.c. ]

"For the purpose of this section, `net operating income' shall mean gross income from all sources, without exclusion, for the taxable year, less (i) operating expenses, (ii) net losses upon assets sold, exchanged or charged off as uncollectible during the taxable year, and (iii) minimum additions during the taxable years to its guaranty fund or surplus required by law or the appropriate federal and state supervisory authorities. . ."

[Note 4] The savings banks and the savings banks association also seek injunctive relief.

[Note 5] Amicus curiae briefs were submitted by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Massachusetts Mortgage Bankers Association, the Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, Inc., the Massachusetts Urban Reinvestment Advisory Group, and the Mutual Savings Central Fund, Inc.

[Note 6] We also note that although the tax rates set forth in G. L. c. 63, Section 11, are less than one percent, the tax base is so broad as to make the issues presented in this case of considerable fiscal significance both to the Commonwealth and to the affected institutions.

[Note 7] The savings banks have first federal savings bank of boston andover ma challenged the excise tax as unreasonable.

[Note 8] Statutec. 14, Section 11, added the income-based portion of the excise, Section 11 (a) (1) & (b) (1), and reduced the rate of tax on the deposits from one-half of one percent to one-twentieth of one percent. The over-all result was an increase in the total tax burden on the banks.

[Note 9] Federal statute 12 U.S.C. Section (h) () provides that "[n]o State, county, municipal, or local taxing authority shall impose any tax on such associations or their franchise, capital, reserves, surplus, loans, or income greater than that imposed by such authority on other similar local mutual or cooperative thrift and home financing institutions." The court in United States v. State Tax Comm'n, F.2d (1st Cir. ), found that the practical application of G. L. c. 63, Section 11 (a) (2) (ii) & (b) (2) (ii), violated 12 U.S.C. Section (h) (). Section 11 (a) (2) (ii) and (b) (2) (ii) permits a bank to deduct, in computing the deposits tax, the unpaid balances on loans secured by the mortgage of real estate located in the Commonwealth or in contiguous States and within 50 miles of the bank's main office. Federal savings and loan associations located in Massachusetts invest a higher percentage of their funds than do State-chartered mutual banks in real estate mortgages outside of the area specified in Section 11, and therefore would be entitled to fewer deductions than the State-chartered banks.

[Note 10] This court's decision in Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation v. Flaherty, Mass. (), cert. denied, U.S. (), is not to the contrary. There the court struck down as invalid a State income tax levied on dividends received from share accounts in Federal savings and loan associations but not on similar income received by shareholders of State-chartered cooperative banks. We read that holding as being based upon the principle that, in our dual system of government, one sovereign may not impose a discriminatory tax that adversely affects the activities of the other. This principle is distinct from the command of the Fourteenth Amendment that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." And so it must be, for if the equal protection clause were applicable to such cases, a State's ability to tax creatures of its own creation would depend largely on the extent to which Congress has allowed State taxation of similar federally-controlled entities. See Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Phelps, U.S. (). Such a result is abhorrent to the idea that the Federal and State governments should retain political freedom to operate within their respective spheres of sovereignty.

[Note 11] The savings banks do not join in this argument.

[Note 12] The mortgage deduction is derived from Section 8 of St.c.entitled, "An Act relieving property from double taxation in certain cases." Its purpose was acknowledged in Lexington Sav. Bank v. Commonwealth, Mass.(), and Suffolk Sav. Bank, petitioner, Mass. 14 ().

[Note 13] Prior tothe deduction was allowed for so much "as is invested in. . [l]oans secured by mortgage of real estate taxable in this commonwealth." G. L. c. 63, Section 12, repealed by St.c. 14, Section This permitted banks to deduct the amount originally invested in the particular asset held, rather than in the actual value of the investment, thus permitting investments to escape taxation altogether. See Report of the Special Commission on Taxation, House Doc. No.at This defect was remedied in by changing the language to permit a deduction for "the unpaid balances on its loans." St.c. 14, Section

[Note 14] Massachusetts savings banks are now empowered to make conventional mortgage loans outside of Massachusetts, and not within a contiguous State and within fifty miles of their main offices, up to a limit of 10% of the bank's deposits, so long as they are also continuing to lend in Massachusetts. G. L. c.Section 35, par. 11, as appearing in St.c.Section 2. Including Veterans' Administration and Federal Housing Administration mortgage loans, a Massachusetts savings bank may now make loans beyond the above geographical limits, up to a limit of % of its deposits or the aggregate book value of its real estate loans within Massachusetts and in contiguous States within fifty miles from its main office, whichever is less.

The geographical limitations placed on cooperative banks have undergone little change since See G. L. c.Sections 23, 24A.

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First Federal Savings Bank of Boston

Home > First Federal Savings Bank of Boston

Status:Inactive as of
 Absorption - Without Assistance
Successor Bank:Envision Bank
Headquarters:First Federal Savings Bank of Boston
Brickstone Square
Andover, MA
Established:
FDIC Insurance:
FDIC Cert:#
Charter Class:Savings associations, state or federal charter, supervised by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)
# of Branches:1
Total Assets:$68,
Total Deposits:$42,

History

Institution established: Original name:Second Federal Savings Bank
Changed organization type to STOCK SAVINGS BANK
Changed name to First Federal Savings Bank of Boston
Changed primary regulatory agency from OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION to COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY
Moved bank headquarters from BOSTON, MA to ANDOVER, MA
Merged into and subsequently operated as part of Randolph Savings Bank () in RANDOLPH, MA
Changed name to Envision Bank ()

Financial Information ( and Older)

Assets and Liabilities

Cash and Balances Due

Securities

U.S. Government Obligations

Total Debt Securities

Net Loans and Leases

1- 4 Family Residential Net Loans and Leases

Loans to Depository Institutions

Total Loans and Leases in Foreign Offices

Maturity & Repricing for Loans and Leases

Small Business Loans

Loans Restructured in Troubled Debt Restructurings

Other Real Estate Owned

Goodwill and Other Intangibles

Total Deposits

Transaction Accounts

Nontransaction Accounts

Time Deposits of Less Than $,

Time Deposits of $, or More

Deposits Based on the $, Reporting Threshold

Deposits Based on the $, Reporting Threshold

Deposits Held in Foreign Offices

Changes in Bank Equity Capital

Total Unused Commitments

Letters of Credit

Total Assets and Liabilities in Foreign Offices

Derivatives

Past Due and Nonaccrual Assets

Past Due 89 Days 1- 4 Family Residential

Past Due 90+ Days 1- 4 Family Residential

Nonaccrual 1- 4 Family Residential

Past Due and Nonaccrual Loans Wholly or Partially US Gvmt Guaranteed

Fiduciary and Related Services

Number of Fiduciary and Related Asset Accounts

Total Fiduciary and Related Assets

Total Managed Assets held in Fiduciary Accounts

Corporate Trust and Agency Accounts

Collective Investment & Common Trust Funds

Gross Fiduciary and Related Services Income

Fiduciary settlements, surcharges, and other losses

Carrying Amount of Assets Covered by FDIC Loss- Share Agreements

Bank Assets Sold and Securitized

Maximum Amount of Credit Exposure Retained

Unused Commitments

Amount of Ownership (Seller) Interests

Memoranda

Income and Expense

Total Interest Income

Total Interest Expense

Trading Account Gains & Fees

Additional Noninterest Income

Additional Noninterest Expense

Loan Charge- Offs and Recoveries

Total Charge- offs 1- 4 Family Residential

Total Recoveries 1- 4 Family Residential

Net Charge- offs 1- 4 Family Residential

Cash Dividends

Interest income and expense in foreign offices

Performance and Condition Ratios

Net charge- offs to loans

Noncurrent loans to loans

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Abington Savings Bank
Alliance Bank
Andover Bank (former)
Athol-Clinton Co-operative Bank
Atlantic Bank (former)
Avidia Bank
Bank of Boston (former)
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Bay State Federal Savings (Brookline)
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Belmont Savings Bank
Benjamin Franklin Bank (former)
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Boston Federal Savings Bank (former)
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Butler Bank (former)
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National Bank of Fairhaven
National Bank of Greece
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Needham Bank
New Bedford Institution for Savings (former)
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North Shore Bank
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Peoples Heritage Bank (former)
Pilgrim Cooperative Bank
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Stoneham Co-operative Bank
Strata Bank (former)
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TD Bank
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Webster Bank (CT)
Webster Federal Credit Union
Webster Five
Wellesley Bank
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Westfield Savings Bank
Weymouth Co-operative Bank (former)
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Worcester County Institute for Savings (former)
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Wrentham Cooperative Bank
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ITT Residential Capital Servicing Corporation

J. E. Robert Company of New England (former)
Matrix Capital
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District: 1
Federal Reserve Bank of: Boston

FilerFiling TypeFiling ProposalEnd of Comment Period BANKERS BANK NORTHEAST * 3A5 Notification by BBN Financial Corporation to acquire Bankers? Bank Northeast, Glastonbury, Connecticut pursuant to section 3(a)(5) of the Bank Holding Company Act ofas amended.
Newspaper: Not available
Federal Register: Not available
HARBORONE BANCORP, INC. * 3A1 Application by HarborOne Mutual Bancshares and HarborOne Bancorp, Inc., both of Brockton, Massachusetts, to become a mutual bank holding company and a mid-tier stock bank holding company, respectively, by acquiring % of the outstanding capital stock of HarborOne Bank, Brockton, Massachusetts, pursuant to section 3(a)(1) of the BHC Act ofas amended, in connection with the conversion of HarborOne Bank from mutual to stock form and a minority stock issuance by the mid-tier holding company.
Newspaper: Not available
Federal Register: 04/11/
RANDOLPH BANCORP, INC. * 4c8
* 3A1 Application by Randolph Bancorp, Inc., Stoughton, Massachusetts to: i) acquire % of the outstanding capital stock of Randolph Savings Bank, Stoughton, Massachusetts, pursuant to section 3(a)(1) of the BHC Act ofas amended, in connection with the conversion of Randolph Bancorp, Stoughton, Massachusetts from mutual to stock form; and ii) acquire First Eastern Bankshares Corporation, Andover, Massachusetts and its wholly-owned subsidiary, First Federal Savings Bank of Boston, Boston, Massachusetts, pursuant to section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act.
Newspaper: 04/17/
Federal Register: 04/08/
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first federal savings bank of boston andover ma
first federal savings bank of boston andover ma

First federal savings bank of boston andover ma -

District: 1
Federal Reserve Bank of: Boston

FilerFiling TypeFiling ProposalEnd of Comment Period BANKERS BANK NORTHEAST * 3A5 Notification by BBN Financial Corporation to acquire Bankers? Bank Northeast, Glastonbury, Connecticut pursuant to section 3(a)(5) of the Bank Holding Company Act of , as amended.
Newspaper: Not available
Federal Register: Not available
HARBORONE BANCORP, INC. * 3A1 Application by HarborOne Mutual Bancshares and HarborOne Bancorp, Inc., both of Brockton, Massachusetts, to become a mutual bank holding company and a mid-tier stock bank holding company, respectively, by acquiring % of the outstanding capital stock of HarborOne Bank, Brockton, Massachusetts, pursuant to section 3(a)(1) of the BHC Act of , as amended, in connection with the conversion of HarborOne Bank from mutual to stock form and a minority stock issuance by the mid-tier holding company.
Newspaper: Not available
Federal Register: 04/11/
RANDOLPH BANCORP, INC. * 4c8
* 3A1 Application by Randolph Bancorp, Inc., Stoughton, Massachusetts to: i) acquire % of the outstanding capital stock of Randolph Savings Bank, Stoughton, Massachusetts, pursuant to section 3(a)(1) of the BHC Act of , as amended, in connection with the conversion of Randolph Bancorp, Stoughton, Massachusetts from mutual to stock form; and ii) acquire First Eastern Bankshares Corporation, Andover, Massachusetts and its wholly-owned subsidiary, First Federal Savings Bank of Boston, Boston, Massachusetts, pursuant to section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act.
Newspaper: 04/17/
Federal Register: 04/08/
Источник: mynewextsetup.us

TD Banknorth

Former bank holding company

TD Banknorth, formerly Banknorth, was a wholly owned subsidiary of the Toronto-Dominion Bank which conducted banking and insurance activities, primarily serving the northeastern area of the United States, headquartered in Portland, Maine. The bank became TD Bank, N.A. on May 31,

In August , Toronto-Dominion Bank became the majority owner, renaming it "TD Banknorth, N.A.", all remaining shares of TD Banknorth were acquired by Toronto-Dominion Bank on April 20,

Its operating companies were Banknorth Connecticut, Peoples Heritage Bank (in Maine), Banknorth Massachusetts, Bank of New Hampshire, Evergreen Bank (in New York), Hudson United Bank, Banknorth Vermont, and Bancnorth Insurance Group. The majority of these companies were branded as TD Banknorth of State (example "TD Banknorth of Maine").

On April 10, , TD Banknorth merged with New Jersey–based Commerce Bank to form TD Bank, with joint headquarters in Cherry Hill, New Jersey and Portland, Maine. The legal name of the bank was changed to TD Bank, N.A. on May 31, , with all TD Banknorth branches outside of New England and all Commerce Bank branches being rebranded in the fall of The remaining branches, in New England, took on the new name in September

History[edit]

The origins of Banknorth Group, now TD Bank, lie in a number of local Mainesavings banks, and in Vermont dating back to with Woodstock National Bank.

Portland Savings Bank[edit]

The Portland Savings Bank was established in , and was initially open only on Wednesdays and Saturdays from &#;a.m. to &#;p.m. Albion K. Parris, Portland’s mayor, was the first President. Support of community and public projects was an important objective of the bank. It weathered the great fire of Portland and the financial panics in and , and at its 50th year in had 24, depositors, deposits of almost $10,,, and a staff of nine. In , a branch on Congress Street joined the Head Office branch, and nineteen years later all business moved to Congress Street.

The Stock Market Crash of and the ensuing Great Depression gravely threatened the bank. To handle the number of properties it came to own through foreclosure, the bank established a “Real Estate Department” or property management division. Returning to prosperity with the post-war mortgage boom, Portland Savings was revolutionized under the leadership of Roger Lambert, CEO from to He encouraged the creation of a more dynamic board of directors and established a wide array of bank services, following the model of the commercial banks. He expanded Portland Savings’ portfolio of commercial loans and introduced innovative retail products such as money market certificates. Between and the bank grew from 2 to 13 branches across Maine, with assets increasing from $63 to $ million

People’s Savings Bank[edit]

People's Savings was founded in in Lewiston, Maine. A conservative but successful bank, it prospered with the local mill economy. Early in the twentieth century the bank innovated by opening $1 accounts for all babies born in the area, on condition that there were no withdrawals for ten years. The policy lasted into the s. Christmas and vacation clubs were also established. Local banks suffered greatly from the decline of the mill economy in the s and s, but enjoyed a recovery during World War II, with industrial renewal and a defense bond business. In the post-war period People's helped finance the new industries that were gradually replacing textiles in the local economy.

Rockland Savings Bank/Heritage Savings Bank[edit]

Rockland Savings was established in in Rockland, Maine, (following attempts in and ). In , it changed its name to the Heritage Savings Bank. In , it merged with:

  • Penobscot Savings, Bangor, founded in and a pioneer in savings for children in association with the local school system. A “small conservative bank in a small conservative city,” it did not expand its branch system until , when a second office was opened.
  • Waterville Savings, founded in Waterville in

Franklin County Savings Bank & Trust Co.[edit]

Franklin County Savings Bank was founded in in St. Albans, Vermont. The bank maintained the name Franklin County Bank until the merger with Lamoille County Bank & Trust Company () in the early s. After the merger, the bank adopted a new name, Franklin Lamoille Bank. The bank also incorporated a holding company named Banknorth.

Woodstock National Bank was founded in and merged into the Howard Bancorp. The Woodstock National Bank maintained its name until June when it merged into its sister bank First Vermont Bank & Trust Company.

Granite Savings Bank & Trust Company[edit]

The Granite Saving Bank & Trust Company was founded in Barre, Vermont in The bank's original office, located on North Main Street in Barre, is now the home for a senior citizen group. The current headquarters is 36 North Main Street, Barre. Banknorth Group Inc. planned to maintain the name until it was purchased by Peoples Bank (Maine). In , Granite Savings Bank & Trust merged with its sister bank The Howard Bank, a change some customers never noticed until their statement arrived.

The Howard Bank N.A.[edit]

The Howard National Bank & Trust Company of Burlington, Vermont, was founded in The Bank bought out a few banks and took them under the Howard Bank name. The Bank changed and shortened its name when it became a more statewide banking company. The Bank also created a banking holding company as "Howard Bancorp" in , and in , the Howard Bancorp merged with Banknorth Group Inc. In the deal, Howard Bancorp decided to take on the Banknorth Group name.

First Vermont Bank & Trust Company[edit]

The First Vermont Bank & Trust was founded in The Company bought Franklin Lamoille Bank and was one of the first banks to offer on-line banking for the tellers. However, when Howard Bancorp purchased Banknorth Group, management found it too expensive to upgrade the systems of the new division. In , the bank acquired Woodstock National Bank and in , all three Vermont banks were merged into Banknorth N.A. Vermont, a division of Banknorth N.A.

The oldest component that Banknorth currently has recorded for the Vermont banking company is Woodstock National Bank. All the Vermont banking companies date to the s with the exception of First Vermont Bank from

Merger of Portland/Peoples/Heritage[edit]

"The late s and early s were difficult years for the thrift industry. As inflation and interest rates soared into double digits, savings banks in Maine and elsewhere found themselves forced to pay higher interest rates to attract depositors while maintaining a large portfolio of long-term low-interest mortgages." In , Portland Savings declared a loss and recognized a pressing need for consolidation in the local banking market. The following year Portland and People's arranged a merger, and the new bank adopted the People's name. In , Peoples and Heritage merged as Peoples Heritage, a billion dollar institution with Wes Bonney as the first President. The new bank, with a total of 35 branches, moved quickly to expand its ATM network, introduce innovations such as Cashline phone banking, and develop an emphasis on commercial loan, a new development for a traditional savings bank. In , in an effort to acquire capital for expansion, Peoples dropped its charter as a mutual bank and rechartered into a public corporation.

With its new resources the bank planned to grow its asset base from $1 billion to $4 billion within five years. This would be accomplished through acquisitions, an expanded branch network, and a rapid increase in commercial lending and real estate. In , Peoples Heritage reorganized itself as a bank holding company in order to gain greater flexibility in making bank and non-bank acquisitions.

Acquisitions in the period were:

  • Northeast Leasing:
  • Six branches from Casco Northern Bank:
  • First Coastal Bank, Portsmouth, NH:
  • Merchants National Bank of Dover
  • First National Bank of Portsmouth, founded
  • Oxford Bank & Trust Company from Bank of Vermont (As part of Bank of Boston's purchase of Bank of Vermont, regulators required it to sell the Oxford Bank & Trust component.) (5 branches - ).
  • Had a $ million personal trusts department, the first venture of Peoples into this area.

Recession and crisis[edit]

In , the Maine real estate market collapsed. In this period of crisis, William J. Ryan became the new president and CEO. In , the recession resulted in bank closures or mergers in New England. Peoples’ stock began to fall as serious problems emerged with bad loans, particularly in the faltering real estate sector, but also in the commercial realm. In the period to , Peoples was losing money, and federal regulators issued a cease and desist order restricting the bank's freedom in the loans area. In response, the management team was shaken up, and special teams were assigned to loans review and restructuring. The bank opened an innovative storefront retail real estate office to move foreclosed properties.

Recovery began by mid The bank had aggressively reduced its portfolio of non-performing loans, and all discernible asset quality trends were positive, resulting in a favorable impact to the bottom line. In , the bank again became profitable, and it re-capitalized with a rights offering in Q4 , generating $38 million in new capital.

Recovery and expansion[edit]

In , the Peoples management held a retreat to plan strategy for future growth. Bill Ryan proposed a doubling of assets to $5 billion through a maximization of market share in Maine and acquisition of other community banks in the region.

The plan resulted in the following acquisitions during the s:

  • Mid-Maine Savings, Auburn, Maine,
  • Bankcore, Inc / North Conway Bank, North Conway, New Hampshire,
  • Bank of New Hampshire, , second largest bank in New Hampshire, founded in , with assets of billion. The acquisition increased the size of Peoples by 1/3 to $ billion. As well, it established People's credentials as a commercial bank. Terms of the merger allowed The Bank of New Hampshire to keep its name and management structure.
  • Family Bancorp, Haverhill, Massachusetts,
  • Atlantic Bancorp, Portland, Maine, 15 branch operation with assets of $,
  • CFX, Keene, New Hampshire, , originally Cheshire County Savings Bank, The acquisition doubled People's assets to $10 billion. NH branches became part of The Bank of New Hampshire, while Massachusetts branches joined Family Bancorp.
  • Springfield Institution for Savings (SIS) , Springfield, Massachusetts - billion in assets, included Glastonbury Bank and Trust Company of Glastonbury, Connecticut
  • Banknorth Group of Burlington, Vermont (), agreement reached in

Peoples becomes Banknorth[edit]

The Banknorth acquisition was the most significant to date, and with it Peoples assumed the Banknorth name. Banknorth Group Inc. was headquartered in Burlington, Vermont. The company was the holding company for: Franklin Lamoille Bank () in St. Albans, The Howard Bank N.A. () in Burlington; Stratevest N.A. (Investment & Managements) in Burlington (FLB, THB, GSB, FVB, FNB, FMB, EB), Granite Savings Bank & Trust Company () in Barre; Woodstock National Bank () in Woodstock, First Vermont Bank, & Trust Company () in Brattleboro, and Farmington National Bank (), Farmington, New Hampshire. The merger increased Peoples' assets to $17 billion and gave it a larger presence in Massachusetts, Vermont, and through Evergreen Bank (Glens Falls, (), in New York.

The completion of the merger was delayed by regulatory review, but on May 10, , Banknorth Group Inc of Portland, Maine came into being. “The Banknorth acquisition brought into the fold eight separate community banks (Franklin Lamoille Bank N.A., The Howard Bank N.A., and First Vermont Bank N.A. in Vermont; Bank of New Hampshire under the charter of Farmington National Bank in New Hampshire, Oxford Bank & Trust, a division of Peoples Heritage Bank, and Peoples Heritage Bank in Maine; First Mass. Bank in Massachusetts, GBT, a division of First Mass Bank in Connecticut, and Evergreen Bank in New York), with branches, together with an investment management firm, Stratevest, that oversaw some 4 billion in assets and a freestanding mortgage-lending unit.”

The new organization renewed its program of acquisitions. “As Banknorth expanded across the map of New England, the message remained the same: community banking values, enhanced by the resources of a major banking organization, create a better bank.”

Acquisitions in the period included:

  • Andover Bancorp, $ billion company, 15 branches in Essex and Middlesex counties, Massachusetts,
  • MetroWest, 17 branches in Boston western suburbs, slightly less than $1 billion in assets,
  • Ipswich Bancshares, 8 branches north of Boston,
  • Warren Bancorp, Essex County, Massachusetts,
  • Community Insurance Agencies, Inc. May
  • Bancorp Connecticut, seven branches and $ million in assets,
  • American Savings Bank, New Britain, Connecticut, Added $4 billion in assets and 47 branches in central Connecticut.
  • CCBT Financial Companies, Parent company of Cape Cod Bank & Trust, with $ billion in assets and 26 branches in Barnstable and Plymouth Counties, Massachusetts,
  • Boston Federal Savings Bank, subsidiary of BostonFed Bancorp, Inc., with $ billion in assets and $ billion in deposits, and 16 branches in Middlesex, Norfolk, Essex, and Suffolk Counties, Massachusetts,

In the s and early s, the emphasis was on the development of a financial services company in a true community bank setting. In , the bank launched what would become Banknorth Insurance Group, and by built the largest insurance brokerage group in New England. By , Banknorth Investment Management Group had grown out of the trust business of the Bank of New Hampshire and Banknorth Vermont's consolidated trusts operation, Stratevest.

On December 31, , the holding company, Banknorth Group, Inc., merged its seven subsidiary banks into one bank, Banknorth NA under the Peoples Heritage Bank charter dating back to , with one OCC charter. Using locally relevant trade names retained the local identity in each state.

TD acquisition[edit]

On August 26, , TD Bank Financial Group announced it had signed an agreement with Banknorth to acquire 51% of the outstanding shares of the company for a total of $ billion US. Banknorth shareholders approved the transaction at a special meeting of shareholders on February 18, , and final approval was announced on March 1, In connection with the transaction, Banknorth changed its name to TD Banknorth Inc. and reincorporated in Delaware.

All remaining shares of TD Banknorth were acquired by Toronto-Dominion Bank on April 20,

Continued growth[edit]

In July , TD Banknorth announced that it had acquired Hudson United Bank, based in Mahwah, New Jersey. Hudson United had earlier acquired numerous regional banks. The acquisition significantly expanded TD Banknorth's presence in both Connecticut and New York and extended the franchise into northern New Jersey and Philadelphia as well. The acquisition was finalized on January 31, , and all HUB locations were converted to TD mynewextsetup.us, most of the former HUB locations, including those taken over by regional banks, are now part of TD Bank, N.A..

TD Banknorth announced acquisition of Interchange Financial Services Corp in April , adding 30 branches in Bergen and Essex counties of New Jersey.

In January , the company finalized acquisition of Boothby & Bartlett Company, a central Maine insurance agency in Waterville.

Banknorth added a sister company, TD Ameritrade, which was formed after the Ameritrade Holding Corporation acquired TD Waterhouse USA from Toronto-Dominion Bank in On November 20, , TD Bank Financial and TD Banknorth entered into an agreement in which TD Bank would acquire all remaining shares of TD Banknorth held by the public for US$ per share in cash. This was completed on April 20, , and TD Banknorth became a wholly owned subsidiary of TD Bank.

On October 2, , Toronto-Dominion announced its plans to acquire Cherry Hill, New Jersey–based Commerce Bancorp, pending shareholder and regulatory approval. The combined company was to be known as TD Commerce Bank, but in March , Commerce Bank & Trust Company of Worcester, Massachusetts filed a lawsuit against TD Banknorth, to bar the bank from using the name TD Commerce Bank in its existing Massachusetts branches.[1] On May 2, , federal Judge F. Dennis Saylor granted a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the use of the TD Commerce name in Massachusetts branches.[2] Toronto-Dominion then dropped plans to add the Commerce name to its banking operation and instead chose to operate all its branches as "TD Bank".

See also[edit]

Miscellaneous Canadian owned US banks[edit]

References[edit]

(All quotes derived from James Hayman, “Taken at the Flood: The Remarkable Unfinished Story of Banknorth Group”, Banknorth Group, This official history is the principal source of information for the summary.)

External links[edit]

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ANDOVER SAVINGS BANK & others vs. COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE (and a companion case ).

ANDOVER SAVINGS BANK & others [Note 1] vs. COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE (and a companion case [Note 2]).

Mass.

May 6, - August 25,

Suffolk County

Present: HENNESSEY, C.J., WILKINS, NOLAN, LYNCH, & O'CONNOR, JJ.

An action by representative savings banks and cooperative banks, seeking a declaration that the bank excise tax imposed by G. L. c. 63, Section 11, is unconstitutional and illegally applied, raised important public questions and was appropriate for treatment by a court notwithstanding the plaintiffs' failure to exhaust their administrative remedies. [] The income-based portion of the bank excise tax imposed by G. L. c. 63, Section 11 (a) (1) and (b) (1), meets the test of reasonableness prescribed by the Massachusetts Constitution. []

Amounts paid by savings banks and cooperative banks to their depositors, including those holding certificates of deposit, were properly treated by the Commissioner of Revenue as being analogous to dividends, rather than operating expenses, and thus such amounts were not deductible from gross income for purposes of calculating the income portion of the bank excise tax imposed by G. L. c. 63, Section []

The Commissioner of Revenue did not err in continuing to apply the deposits portion of the bank excise tax to State-chartered mutual savings banks and cooperative banks, following a Federal Circuit Court decision that this aspect of the tax, as applied to Federal savings and loan associations, violated Federal law, where it was clear that the Legislature intended to continue to tax State-chartered institutions. []

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State-chartered savings banks and cooperative banks were not denied their constitutional right to equal protection of the laws by reason of the fact that the deposits portion of the bank excise tax established by G. L. c. 63, Section 11, continued to be imposed upon them following a Federal Circuit Court decision that Federal law did not permit imposition of that portion of the tax on Federal savings and loan associations. []

In an action seeking relief from the bank excise tax imposed by G. L. c. 63, Section 11, there was no merit in the contention that cooperative banks were denied equal protection of the laws because they were taxed differently from State-chartered commercial banks. []

Part II, c. 1, Section 1, art. 4, of the Massachusetts Constitution did not require excise taxes to be proportional in their effect on mutual banks and State-chartered commercial banks, as the respective privileges of the two classes of banks are different in character. []

Provisions of G. L. c. 63, Section 11, which place a geographical limitation on mortgage loans which qualify for a deduction in calculating the deposits portion of the bank excise tax, did not impermissibly discriminate against interstate commerce, in view of circumstances that the statutory intent was merely to avoid double taxation of real estate, that the resulting burden on out-of-State borrowers was speculative and insubstantial, that banking activities are of "profound local concern," and that Congress has recognized the validity of geographical restrictions imposed by States upon mutual banks. []

CIVIL ACTIONS commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on December 18,

The cases were reported by Liacos, J.

Laurence H. Tribe (Kenneth A. Cohen with him) for Andover Savings Bank & others.

Stanley V. Ragalevsky (Karen J. Bloom with him) for Stoneham Co-operative Bank & another.

Stephen S. Ostrach, Assistant Attorney General (Charles E. Walker, Assistant Attorney General, with him) for Commissioner of Revenue.

Donald J. Barry, Jr., for Massachusetts Mortgage Bankers Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Peter W. Coogan & Scott C. Moriearty, for Mutual Savings Central Fund, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Theodore C. Landsmark, for Massachusetts Urban Reinvestment Advisory Group, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

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Thomas A. Brooks, F. Douglas Birdzell, W. Randolph Torres & Thomas W. Lawless, Jr., for Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Richard A. Manley, for Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

HENNESSEY, C.J. In this consolidated action filed in the county court, the plaintiffs, who are six savings banks, a savings banks association, and two cooperative banks, seek to have this court declare that the bank excise tax levied by G. L. c. 63, Section 11, [Note 3] is unconstitutional and also illegally applied by the Commissioner of Revenue. [Note 4] See G. L. c. A.

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The case is before us on reservation and report by a single justice of this court, with an accompanying statement of agreed facts. [Note 5] The plaintiffs make four claims: (1) that the excise is unreasonable and therefore in violation of Part II, c. 1, Section 1, art. 4, of the Massachusetts Constitution; (2) that the Commissioner has incorrectly interpreted G. L. c. 63, Section 11, so as to forbid the plaintiff banks to deduct as an "operating expense" the dividends or interest paid to depositors; (3) that Section 11 is being discriminatorily applied contrary to the Massachusetts Constitution and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (4) that one aspect of Section 11 impermissibly interferes with interstate commerce, and is therefore contrary to art. I, Section 8, of the Constitution of the United States. We conclude that each of these claims is without merit and hold that the excise is constitutional.

1. As a preliminary matter, we note that the defendant does not argue that, because the plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before the Appellate Tax Board, a declaratory judgment should be denied in this case. Where the Legislature has provided an administrative procedure for resolving certain types of controversies, the "requirement of exhaustion will be suspended only when the facts of a particular case raise important public questions whose resolution concerns or will affect more persons than the parties to the case." East Chop Tennis Club v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, Mass. , (). We agree that this case involves issues of law that affect every thrift institution chartered under the laws of this Commonwealth, and that this case is therefore an appropriate one with which to deal in a declaratory proceeding.

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See First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, Mass. , (), aff'd, U.S. (). [Note 6]

2. The Constitution of the Commonwealth authorizes the General Court to impose "reasonable" excises on the privilege of transacting business as a corporation. Part II, c. 1, Section 1, art. 4. See S.S. White Dental Mfg. Co. v. Commonwealth, Mass. 35 , 38 () (constitutional reference to "commodities" includes the privilege of transacting business as a corporation), aff'd, U.S. 68 (). See also Commissioner of Revenue v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., Mass. , (). The cooperative banks [Note 7] broadly attack G. L. c. 63, Section 11, as unreasonable and therefore in violation of that constitutional limit on the legislative power. They do not appear to argue that the deposits portion of the excise, Section 11 (a) (2) & (b) (2), is unreasonable, nor could they well do so in light of the well-reasoned decision upholding that aspect of the tax in Commonwealth v. People's Five Cents Sav. Bank, 5 Allen (). See Provident Inst. v. Massachusetts, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) (), affirming Commonwealth v. Provident Inst. for Sav., 12 Allen (). Rather, the thrust of their argument is that the income-based portion of the excise tax, Section 11 (a) (1) & (b) (1), is unreasonable as interpreted and applied by the Commissioner because it does not fairly measure the present existing value of the franchises of the banks. They point out that while the pretax profits of the banks have in recent years decreased, the amount of taxes assessed under Section 11 has increased. In particular, it is argued that amounts paid as interest to depositors constitute a "cost" of doing business and therefore must be deducted from "net operating income" if the excise is to measure accurately the value of the privilege of conducting business as a corporation.

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The parties agree that the thrift industry in Massachusetts is currently experiencing severe financial difficulties. A major factor has been the rise of interest rates in recent years. It appears that, during the 's and 's, thrift institutions (also referred to as "mutual" institutions) invested their funds mostly in long-term, fixed-rate real estate loans at interest rates which, by today's standards, are relatively low. According to the agreed statement of facts, depositors at that time put their money primarily into regular savings accounts which yielded returns of approximately 4 1/2% to 5 1/2%. Because the banks were able to get average returns on their loans at higher rates than were paid to the depositors, they were able to operate on a sound financial basis. As interest rates rose in the late 's, however, these banks were forced to pay higher rates in order to continue attracting depositors. Many depositors withdrew their money from regular savings accounts and purchased term certificates of deposit which yielded returns at higher rates of 13% to 16%. The banks' investments in outstanding long-term loans have continued to yield returns at the relatively lower interest rates existing at the time they were made. Although total investment returns have increased in recent years, they have not kept up with the sharp increase in funds paid to depositors. Several of the plaintiffs have been unable in the last two years to earn sufficient income to cover the amount of these funds and overhead expenses.

The plaintiffs assert that this situation has been exacerbated by the Commissioner's interpretation of G. L. c. 63, Section Section 11, in addition to imposing a tax on deposits, also levies a tax on "net operating income" defined as gross income for the taxable year, less "operating expenses" and other deductions not relevant to this case. The Commissioner interprets "operating expenses" as not encompassing amounts paid to depositors in the form of interest or dividends. Without the deduction for amounts paid to depositors, the taxes assessed on the banks under Section 11 have generally increased even though the banks have been experiencing significantly lower earnings, and even losses.

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In addressing a constitutional challenge to a tax measure, we begin with the premise that the tax is endowed with a presumption of validity and is not to be found void unless its invalidity is established beyond a rational doubt. Eaton, Crane & Pike Co. v. Commonwealth, Mass. , (). Commonwealth v. People's Five Cents Sav. Bank, supra at See Johnson v. Martignetti, Mass. , (). The Legislature is empowered to impose a reasonable excise on any franchise or privilege conferred by the Commonwealth. The limitation that an excise be "reasonable" was not intended to give to the judiciary the right to revise decisions of the Legislature that might be thought unwise or inexpedient. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, Mass. , (). Nevertheless, the Legislature may not impose an excise tax which is based upon "false and unjust principles," Commonwealth v. People's Five Cents Sav. Bank, supra at , or which exacts assessments that are "grossly oppressive or contrary to common right," American Uniform Co. v. Commonwealth, Mass. 42 , 45 (), or which does not "show a proper proportion between the benefits received and the sum paid for the enjoyment of them," Suffolk Sav. Bank for Seamen, petitioner, Mass. , ().

These principles cannot be applied in a vacuum. The constitutionality of an excise must be judged in relation to the nature of the entity upon which it is imposed. Mutual banking institutions, which consist of savings banks, cooperative banks, and savings and loan associations, are nonprofit organizations established solely for the benefit of their depositors. Their original purpose was to encourage thrift and also to afford a method by which the profits and advantages arising from the use of large amounts of money could be enjoyed by persons of moderate means. Commonwealth v. People's Five Cents Sav. Bank, supra at Bank of Redemption v. Boston, U.S. 60, 68 (). In addition, they were "designed to make it easier for a person to borrow money to build, buy or repair a home and to make available a certain amount of capital for government and

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public enterprise securities." Report of the Special Commission on Taxation, House Doc. No. , at This public purpose remains unchanged today. Unlike commercial banks (which consist of national banks, trust companies, and banking companies), mutual institutions are not owned by stockholders who have invested in the stock of the bank. Instead, savings banks are "owned" by their depositors, and cooperative banks and savings and loan associations are "owned" by member shareholders. Id. See generally G. L. c. (savings banks); G. L. c. (cooperative banks); 12 U.S.C. Section ( & Supp. IV ) (Federal savings and loan associations). See also Dunham v. Ware Sav. Bank, Mass. 63 , 73 ().

In determining whether the excise imposed by Section 11 fairly measures the value of the franchise, the plaintiffs would have this court think of "value" as something akin to what might be produced if a particular mutual bank were sold to private buyers. But the value of transacting business as a savings bank or cooperative bank lies not in any surplus that may be accumulated, but rather in the benefits that are enjoyed by the depositors and borrowers. See Commonwealth v. People's Five Cents Sav. Bank, 5 Allen , (). We have no doubt that, viewed in this light, the income-based portion of the excise is reasonable. It is not a type of corporate income tax. It measures the value of the bank's investment function according to the returns that are realized for the benefit of its depositors. This is at least as reasonable a measure of the privilege as is the deposits tax, which measures the bank's investment function according to the total deposits available for investment. Greater precision in measuring the value of the privilege is not constitutionally required. Commissioner of Revenue v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., Mass. , (). Springfield Ins. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, Mass. , ().

3. The plaintiffs contend that the Commissioner has incorrectly interpreted Section 11 by refusing to permit the plaintiffs to deduct, as "operating expenses," interest or dividends

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paid to depositors. It is argued that the obligation of a savings bank or cooperative bank to its depositors constitutes a debt, and that any periodic payment to depositors should be equated with the payment of interest to a creditor, and thus represents an operating expense. We addressed a similar question in the context of federally-chartered savings and loan associations in First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, Mass. , (), aff'd, U.S. (), and upheld the Commissioner's position. The court concluded that the relationship between a Federal savings and loan association and its members is more like an ownership status than a debtor-creditor relationship, and that therefore any payment is more analogous to a dividend than a payment of interest.

What we said earlier in this case dispose of the plaintiffs' contention that First Federal is distinguishable. The fact that the depositors of savings banks and cooperative banks do not share some of the attributes of ownership discussed in First Federal, supra at , does not alter the essential relationship that exists between these mutual banks and their depositors. In the case of savings banks, the earnings may be distributed to the depositors, G. L. c. , Sections B, and any undivided profits are credited to surplus accounts "to meet losses, contingencies and adjustments arising out of or incidental to the operation of [the bank's] business." G. L. c. , Section 57, as appearing in St. , c. , Section 6. Accumulated surplus is held in reserve for the benefit of the depositors. Dunham v. Ware Sav. Bank, Mass. 63 , 73 (). If a savings bank is voluntarily dissolved, the debts of the bank are satisfied first, after which the remaining proceeds are distributed among the depositors. G. L. c. , Section 71 (2), (4). These provisions are consistent with an ownership status. Cooperative banks are similar in many respects. See G. L. c. , Sections 31, 37, 37A, 38, 40; St. , c. 73, Sections , as amended (Mass. Ann. Laws c. App. []). We recognize that, in practice, these features of the relationship between depositor and bank are of little significance to the average depositor. Government regulation of

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the banking industry affects the rates that may be paid to depositors, and insures depositors against the risks of bank failure. Nevertheless, such regulation does not alter the essential purpose for which mutual banks are established. For certain other purposes it may be more convenient to view the relationship between depositor and bank as that of debtor-creditor. Cf. Carpenter v. Suffolk Franklin Sav. Bank, Mass. , (); Laighton v. Brookline Trust Co., Mass. (); Atwood v. Dumas, Mass. (). For tax purposes, however, we think that there is ample support for the Commissioner's position that payments made to depositors are analogous to dividends and thus not deductible as "operating expenses." See Dunham v. Ware Sav. Bank, supra at 73; Lewis v. Lynn Inst. for Sav., Mass. (); Commonwealth v. People's Five Cents Sav. Bank, 5 Allen ().

The plaintiffs also argue that holders of certificates of deposit more clearly have debt rather than equity relationships with the banks. In support of this contention, they observe that the certificate of deposit relationship is regulated by a written agreement, and that the rate at which payments are to be made to the holder is fixed in advance by the agreement. These superficial similarities to a debtor-creditor relationship, however, should not be permitted to disguise or alter what has already been said about the nature and purpose of mutual banks. It must be kept in mind that the excise imposed by Section 11 -- both the deposits-based portion and the income-based portion -- is intended to tax that function of mutual banks which works to the benefit of those who enjoy the banks' privileges. One measure of that function is the amount of investment returns distributed to those who invest their savings in the business of these banks. In order for the excise to be faithful to this purpose, it must be levied upon the returns payable to all investors, including holders of certificates of deposit. Even if we accept that the words "operating expenses" are ambiguous, the Commissioner's long-standing interpretation of this phrase, including her conclusion that holders of certificates

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of deposit are to be treated the same as all other depositors, "is entitled to some weight in resolving the statutory ambiguity." First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, Mass. , (). See Metropolitan Property & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., Mass. , (); Rockland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., Mass. , (). We think, therefore, that the Commissioner has not exceeded her authority in refusing to allow a deduction for payments made to holders of certificates of deposit.

4. We next consider the plaintiffs' argument that the Commissioner has erred in applying the deposits portion of the excise to the State-chartered mutual institutions but not to Federal savings and loan associations. Prior to , Section 11 did not impose any tax on Federal savings and loan associations. Statute , c. 14, Section 11, rewrote G. L. c. 63, Section 11, to make it applicable to all mutual banks located in Massachusetts, including Federal savings and loan associations, and also to increase the taxes payable by the banks. [Note 8] In , however, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in United States v. State Tax Comm'n, F.2d (1st Cir. ), held that the deposits aspect of Section 11, as applied to Federal savings and loan associations, violated 12 U.S.C. Section (h) (), and was therefore invalid to that extent. [Note 9] Since the First Circuit decision, those

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Federal associations have not paid the deposits-based measure of the tax, but have paid only the net operating income measure of the excise tax. The Commissioner has continued to impose the deposits-based portion of the excise tax on Massachusetts savings banks and cooperative banks.

The plaintiffs first argue that the primary purpose of Section 11 is to tax Federal and State institutions equally, and that the Commissioner's application of the deposits tax to the plaintiffs and not to Federal savings and loan associations is therefore contrary to the legislative intent and constitutes an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative function. It cannot be doubted that equality of treatment was intended when the Legislature enacted St. , c. 14, Section It may even be argued that the primary purpose of the amendment to G. L. c. 63, Section 11, was to equalize the tax treatment of Federal savings and loan associations and State mutual banks (although this is open to substantial doubt). However, we think it unrealistic to conclude that G. L. c. 63, Section 11, taken as a whole, has as its primary object the equal treatment of Federal and State banks. Common sense indicates that, unless it clearly appears to the contrary, the foremost purpose of a tax measure is to raise revenues. In these circumstances, we do not believe that the Legislature, had it been faced with the question, would have wanted the deposits tax to be entirely voided rather than to be applied only to State banks.

Our conclusion on this point is reinforced by the fact that, two years after the decision in United States v. State Tax Comm'n, supra, the Legislature enacted St. , c. , Section 44, which struck out Section 11 and inserted identical language, except for increases made in the rates of the excise. This reenactment of Section 11 manifests a legislative intent to continue taxing the State banks. "[W]hen the same legislature, in

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a later statute, use the terms of an earlier one which has received a judicial construction, that construction is to be given to the later statute. . . . For if it were intended to exclude any known construction of a previous statute, the legal presumption is, that its terms would be so changed as to effect that intention." Matter of Jones, Mass. , (), quoting from Commonwealth v. Hartnett, 3 Gray , (). See Lorillard v. Pons, U.S. , (). Although this case does not involve a judicial "construction" of a statute, but rather a judicial modification dictated by constitutional law, the principle is the same. The Legislature is presumed to be aware of any effects that a judicial decision may have on the operation of a statute. Given the direct impact that the Federal court decision in United States v. State Tax Comm'n had on State revenues, it is unlikely that the Legislature was ignorant of the decision or of the Commissioner's response to it. Surely the Legislature would not have reenacted the tax if it had intended that State banks also be exempted from its provisions. The logical conclusion is that the Legislature in intended that Section 11 remain in effect as to State-chartered banks, but at the higher rates set by the law.

The plaintiffs make the further argument that the failure to tax State-chartered mutual banks and Federal savings and loan associations alike violated the plaintiffs' right to equal protection of the laws. It is asserted that the business of Federal savings and loan associations is substantially similar to that of savings banks and cooperative banks incorporated in this Commonwealth, see Springfield Inst. for Sav. v. Worcester Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, Mass. , , cert. denied, U.S. (); Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation v. Flaherty, Mass. (), cert. denied, U.S. (), and that the classification made by the Commissioner's application of the statute is without any rational basis. We disagree.

When economic regulation is challenged as a violation of the equal protection clause, the traditional inquiry is "whether

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the classification involved rationally furthers a legitimate State interest." Blue Hills Cemetery, Inc. v. Board of Registration in Embalming & Funeral Directing, Mass. , (), quoting from Johnson v. Martignetti, Mass. , (). The banks argue that, since Massachusetts has no legitimate purpose in classifying Federal savings and loan associations and State-chartered banks differently, the tax must be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, Mass. (); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Director of the Div. on the Necessaries of Life, Mass. (). However, we believe that the traditional equal protection analysis is not entirely applicable where the classification that is made is between an entity of the State, and an agency or instrumentality of the Federal government. The Federal structure of our national government itself implies that a State may draw a distinction between its own entities and similar Federal agencies or instrumentalities for no other reason than that they are the creations of the different sovereigns; provided, of course, that the classification does not run afoul of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.

Whether or not this is true as a general principle, there is no doubt that it is true with respect to State taxation of banks. In Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Phelps, U.S. (), a case similar to this one, the United States Supreme Court held that Alabama did not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by taxing the shares of certain State commercial banks but not the shares of national banks. The Court observed that a State has no power to tax a federally-chartered bank unless expressly authorized by Congress. Id. at , and cases cited. See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) (). The Court then stated: "This is enough to negative the idea that shares of National and State banks are essentially the same for purposes of taxation. . . . [National banks] are of a class wholly distinct from the property of ordinary corporations or individuals, and this fact cannot be disregarded by

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the State. If the State sees fit to tax unrestricted property within her jurisdiction and to omit National Bank shares, the classification cannot be said to be arbitrary and wholly unreasonable -- the basis of it is plain enough. It may be vastly more important for the State to omit National Bank shares and tax ordinary moneyed capital according to a plan not permissible in respect of National Bank shares rather than conform to the standard prescribed by Congress. There is nothing to indicate that Congress ever supposed that mere establishment of a National Bank within a State could upset the scheme for taxation, theretofore entirely proper, by producing conflict with the XIV Amendment. This view would subject the taxing power of the State to the will of Congress far beyond what is necessary for the protection of federal agencies." Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Phelps, supra at

It is argued that the constitutional underpinnings of Phelps have been eroded by more recent decisions which suggest that the Federal principles espoused in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) (), no longer require that national banks be immune from State taxation. See First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, Mass. , (), reversed on other grounds, U.S. (); United States v. New Mexico, U.S. (). It is undisputed, however, that by virtue of the supremacy clause State taxation of national banks is prohibited unless congressionally authorized. First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, U.S. (). Whether the immunity of national banks from State taxation is derived from the supremacy clause or from broader principles of federalism implicit in the Federal Constitution, the language of the Phelps case is equally applicable. The classification made by Congress is endowed with constitutional validity, and thus carries with it the necessary implication that the States may make the same

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classification. [Note 10] The same reasoning holds true under our State Constitution.

The cooperative banks make a similar argument that their right to equal protection of the laws has been violated because mutual banks are taxed differently from State-chartered commercial banks. [Note 11] The contention clearly is without merit. Mutual banks and commercial banks are different in their organizational structure and purpose, and they have been subject to different methods of taxation for over years. Report of the Special Commission on Taxation, House Doc. No. , at , The Legislature could reasonably conclude that these differences warrant different tax treatment. Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Phelps, supra at Bank of Redemption v. Boston, U.S. 60, ().

There is also a suggestion by the cooperative banks that under our State Constitution, Part II, c. 1, Section 1, art. 4, an excise must be proportional in its effect on mutual banks and commercial banks. This argument is also without merit. Although an excise tax "must operate alike on all persons who exercise a particular employment or enjoy the same privilege or commodity," Oliver v. Washington Mills,11

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Allen , (), the principle does not apply where, as in the case of mutual banks and commercial banks, the privilege enjoyed is of a different character. That these privileges are different has already been demonstrated.

5. We turn next to the contention that one aspect of the deposits tax constitutes an impermissible discrimination against interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause, art. 1, Section 8, cl. 3 of the United States Constitution. Section 11 allows a bank, in computing the tax, to deduct from taxable deposits "the unpaid balance on its loans secured by the mortgage of real estate taxable in this commonwealth, or real estate situated in a state contiguous to the commonwealth, and within a radius of fifty miles of the main office of such bank or association." The banks assert that by setting a geographical limitation on mortgage loans which qualify for the deduction, the deposits tax discourages mutual banks from lending money in other States, thereby discriminating against interstate commerce.

Although the purpose of the deduction at issue here is not necessarily controlling in deciding whether there is a violation of the commerce clause, see Philadelphia v. New Jersey, U.S. , (), we note that the avowed statutory intent is to avoid double taxation of real estate, property owners being subject to local real estate taxation. [Note 12] Originally, the deduction applied only to loans made in Massachusetts, because the State's mutual banks had no power to make loans outside the State. The deduction has never been accurately attuned to its purpose. [Note 13] In

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, the savings banks were permitted to make loans in contiguous States upon real estate located within twenty-five miles of a bank's main office. St. , c. , Section 1. The geographical limit was extended to fifty miles by St. , c. , Section 1 (amending G. L. c. , Section 34, par. 2). Cooperative banks were permitted in to make contiguous-States loans within twenty-five miles, St. , c. , Section 1 (amending G. L. c. , Section 23), and in the limit was extended to fifty miles. St. , c. The deduction, however, was not extended to the present fifty-mile limit until See St. , c. 14, Sections 11, Even then the deduction was not made available with respect to certain loans that were permitted beyond the geographical limits, i.e., real estate loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration or the Veterans' Administration. See G. L. c. , Section 35, par. 11, as appearing in St. , c. , Section 1 (savings banks); G. L. c. , Section 24A, inserted by St. , c. (cooperative banks). Although the deduction has remained the same since , the geographical limitations on loans made by savings banks have been further relaxed in recent years. See G. L. c. , Section 35, par. 11, as appearing in St. , c. , Section 2. [Note 14]

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We assume for the purposes of this case that G. L. c. 63, Section 11, discourages mutual banks from investing in mortgage loans outside the fifty-mile limit. If we were to accept the banks' reasoning that a State may not discourage mutual banks incorporated under its laws from investing in such loans, then surely it would follow that a State may not prohibit such investments altogether. Yet historically, State banks have never had the right to exercise their corporate powers outside of their home State unless expressly authorized by law. See 4 Michie, Banks and Banking c. 7, Section 3 (). See also Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) , (). Geographical restrictions of the type imposed by Massachusetts are common among the eastern States, see Encyclopedia of Banking Laws (H. Bailey, ed. ), and undoubtedly have existed since the early days of the mutual banking industry. Although the banks do not expressly so argue, their reasoning amounts essentially to a claim that all such geographical restrictions are invalid as a violation of the commerce clause.

We disagree that Section 11, as well as the other geographical restrictions placed on Massachusetts mutual institutions, constitutes the type of "simple economic protectionism" that evokes "a virtually per se rule of invalidity" under the commerce clause. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, U.S. , (). It is true that the restrictions discriminate between mortgage loans made within Massachusetts and those made outside the State and beyond the fifty-mile limit. Nevertheless, we do not think that they fall within that class of cases relied on by the plaintiffs. The cases cited by the banks can be categorized as holding either (1) that a State may not block the flow of natural resources or products of trade from one State to another in order to satisfy local needs, e.g., New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, U.S. (); Hughes v. Oklahoma, U.S. (); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, U.S. (), or (2) that a State may not impose a greater burden on out-of-State businesses to the direct advantage of local interests, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, U.S. ();

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Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., U.S. 27 (); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, U.S. (); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, U.S. ().

We first reject any suggestion that Massachusetts is blocking the flow of its natural resources or products of trade to other States. If the flow of anything is being inhibited, it is money that would otherwise be destined for out-of-State borrowers. Money is a medium of exchange and not a natural resource or product of trade. Moreover, there is no general interference with the interstate flow of money. Compare Hughes v. Oklahoma, U.S. () (holding invalid a State law prohibiting the export for sale of natural minnows procured within the State). Here, only one means of exchange out of countless others is being restricted.

Nor do we find applicable those cases invalidating State laws which effect "simple economic protectionism." Philadelphia v. New Jersey, U.S. , (). If the deposits tax favors local interests at the expense of out-of-State interests, it does so only by discouraging certain out-of-State borrowers from doing business with Massachusetts mutual banks on a fully competitive basis. (Certainly foreign banks are not burdened by the operation of the tax.) Any such burden on out-of-State borrowers, we think, is too speculative to evoke the prohibitions of the commerce clause. The deposits tax is only one-sixteenth of one percent of the average amount of a bank's deposits. We cannot assume that this will significantly discourage Massachusetts mutual banks from competing in other States, or that any such decline in competition would necessarily affect the availability or price of real estate mortgages. It is just as likely that foreign banking institutions fully compensate for any lack of competition engendered by Massachusetts' regulatory policies.

But even if we were to assume that the tax has a meaningful impact on the market for real estate loans in other States, it would not follow that it is invalid. We think that a State may create a certain class of corporations and limit their activities

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to intrastate transactions without violating the commerce clause. There is no inherent right to conduct business as a corporation. It is a privilege which may be granted or withheld by the State, and may be made subject to such terms and restrictions as the State deems appropriate. So long as no significant discriminatory burden is placed on foreign businesses in their conduct of interstate trade, and so long as the interstate flow of natural resources or products of trade is not obstructed, we think that a State may restrict a class of domestic corporations to the transacting of intrastate business in order to ensure that the citizens of the State will be the primary beneficiaries of the grant of the privilege. Banking activities are "of profound local concern," Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., U.S. 27, 38 (), and the impact of the challenged tax law is not " `parochial' in the sense that it overtly prevents foreign enterprises from competing in local markets." Id. at

We also observe that Congress itself has recognized the validity of geographical restrictions imposed on mutual banks. There is of course no doubt that Congress has the power to "permit the states to regulate the commerce in a manner which would otherwise not be permissible." Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, U.S. , (). The Home Owners' Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. Sections ( & Supp. IV ), which authorizes the organization of Federal savings and loan associations, provides that "[a]n association which was formerly organized as a savings bank under State law shall be subject to the requirements of State law . . . pertaining to discrimination in the extension of home mortgage loans or adjustment in the terms of mortgage instruments based on neighborhood or geographical area . . . if the [Federal Home Loan Bank] Board determines that State law and regulations impose more stringent requirements than Federal law and regulations." 12 U.S.C. Section (a)(1) (Supp. IV ). It is unlikely that Congress would have required that banks be subject to State geographical limitations unless it considered such restrictions to be valid. It is also noteworthy that Massachusetts'

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regulatory policy is consistent with a similar congressional policy expressed in the Community Reinvestment Act of , 12 U.S.C. Sections (Supp. IV ). The act directs "each appropriate Federal financial supervisory agency to use its authority when examining [regulated] financial institutions, to encourage such institutions to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered." 12 U.S.C. Section (b). Federal banking authorities have issued regulations in furtherance of this purpose. See 12 C.F.R. Section 25 (), 12 C.F.R. Section (), and 12 C.F.R. Section (). In addition, Federal savings and loan associations are also restricted to making commercial, corporate, and business loans only "within the State where the bank is located or within 75 miles of the bank's home office." 12 U.S.C. Section (a)(2)(B) (Supp. IV ). These Federal laws exhibit an understanding on the part of Congress that geographical restrictions of the sort imposed by Massachusetts are valid and even desirable regulatory policy.

In sum, we conclude that Section 11 does not impermissibly discriminate against interstate commerce. The commerce clause was intended to create "an area of trade free from interference by the States." Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, U.S. , (), quoting from Freeman v. Hewit, U.S. , (). It was not intended, we think, to preclude the States from placing geographical restrictions on the activities of domestically-chartered mutual banking institutions.

6. We conclude our discussion by stating generally that, if the plaintiffs are to get relief from fiscal difficulties in what are concededly hard economic times, they should seek that relief from the Legislature. It is not within the province of this court to invalidate a tax merely because it has come to seem burdensome in recent years due to changed economic conditions. Banking is a heavily regulated industry, and the ills that now beset thrift institutions appear to be the result of a complex array of regulatory and economic

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factors. If a cure is to be had for these ills, it should be accomplished by legislative action.

Judgment is to be entered denying injunctive relief and declaring that G. L. c. 63, Section 11, is constitutional as applied to the plaintiffs, and that the Commissioner has not exceeded her authority in construing "operating expenses" not to include payments made in the form of interest or dividends to depositors or holders of certificates of deposit.

So ordered.

FOOTNOTES

[Note 1] First American Bank for Savings, Home Savings Bank, Mutual Bank for Savings, The Provident Institution for Savings in the Town of Boston, Worcester County Institution for Savings, and Savings Banks Association of Massachusetts.

[Note 2] Stoneham Co-operative Bank & another vs. Commissioner of Revenue. The other plaintiff is the Haverhill Co-operative Bank.

[Note 3] General Laws c. 63, Section 11, as appearing in St. , c. ]

"For the purpose of this section, `net operating income' shall mean gross income from all sources, without exclusion, for the taxable year, less (i) operating expenses, (ii) net losses upon assets sold, exchanged or charged off as uncollectible during the taxable year, and (iii) minimum additions during the taxable years to its guaranty fund or surplus required by law or the appropriate federal and state supervisory authorities . . . ."

[Note 4] The savings banks and the savings banks association also seek injunctive relief.

[Note 5] Amicus curiae briefs were submitted by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Massachusetts Mortgage Bankers Association, the Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, Inc., the Massachusetts Urban Reinvestment Advisory Group, and the Mutual Savings Central Fund, Inc.

[Note 6] We also note that although the tax rates set forth in G. L. c. 63, Section 11, are less than one percent, the tax base is so broad as to make the issues presented in this case of considerable fiscal significance both to the Commonwealth and to the affected institutions.

[Note 7] The savings banks have not challenged the excise tax as unreasonable.

[Note 8] Statute , c. 14, Section 11, added the income-based portion of the excise, Section 11 (a) (1) & (b) (1), and reduced the rate of tax on the deposits from one-half of one percent to one-twentieth of one percent. The over-all result was an increase in the total tax burden on the banks.

[Note 9] Federal statute 12 U.S.C. Section (h) () provides that "[n]o State, county, municipal, or local taxing authority shall impose any tax on such associations or their franchise, capital, reserves, surplus, loans, or income greater than that imposed by such authority on other similar local mutual or cooperative thrift and home financing institutions." The court in United States v. State Tax Comm'n, F.2d (1st Cir. ), found that the practical application of G. L. c. 63, Section 11 (a) (2) (ii) & (b) (2) (ii), violated 12 U.S.C. Section (h) (). Section 11 (a) (2) (ii) and (b) (2) (ii) permits a bank to deduct, in computing the deposits tax, the unpaid balances on loans secured by the mortgage of real estate located in the Commonwealth or in contiguous States and within 50 miles of the bank's main office. Federal savings and loan associations located in Massachusetts invest a higher percentage of their funds than do State-chartered mutual banks in real estate mortgages outside of the area specified in Section 11, and therefore would be entitled to fewer deductions than the State-chartered banks.

[Note 10] This court's decision in Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation v. Flaherty, Mass. (), cert. denied, U.S. (), is not to the contrary. There the court struck down as invalid a State income tax levied on dividends received from share accounts in Federal savings and loan associations but not on similar income received by shareholders of State-chartered cooperative banks. We read that holding as being based upon the principle that, in our dual system of government, one sovereign may not impose a discriminatory tax that adversely affects the activities of the other. This principle is distinct from the command of the Fourteenth Amendment that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." And so it must be, for if the equal protection clause were applicable to such cases, a State's ability to tax creatures of its own creation would depend largely on the extent to which Congress has allowed State taxation of similar federally-controlled entities. See Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Phelps, U.S. (). Such a result is abhorrent to the idea that the Federal and State governments should retain political freedom to operate within their respective spheres of sovereignty.

[Note 11] The savings banks do not join in this argument.

[Note 12] The mortgage deduction is derived from Section 8 of St. , c. , entitled, "An Act relieving property from double taxation in certain cases." Its purpose was acknowledged in Lexington Sav. Bank v. Commonwealth, Mass. , (), and Suffolk Sav. Bank, petitioner, Mass. 1 , 4 ().

[Note 13] Prior to , the deduction was allowed for so much "as is invested in . . . [l]oans secured by mortgage of real estate taxable in this commonwealth." G. L. c. 63, Section 12, repealed by St. , c. 14, Section This permitted banks to deduct the amount originally invested in the particular asset held, rather than in the actual value of the investment, thus permitting investments to escape taxation altogether. See Report of the Special Commission on Taxation, House Doc. No. , at This defect was remedied in by changing the language to permit a deduction for "the unpaid balances on its loans." St. , c. 14, Section

[Note 14] Massachusetts savings banks are now empowered to make conventional mortgage loans outside of Massachusetts, and not within a contiguous State and within fifty miles of their main offices, up to a limit of 10% of the bank's deposits, so long as they are also continuing to lend in Massachusetts. G. L. c. , Section 35, par. 11, as appearing in St. , c. , Section 2. Including Veterans' Administration and Federal Housing Administration mortgage loans, a Massachusetts savings bank may now make loans beyond the above geographical limits, up to a limit of % of its deposits or the aggregate book value of its real estate loans within Massachusetts and in contiguous States within fifty miles from its main office, whichever is less.

The geographical limitations placed on cooperative banks have undergone little change since See G. L. c. , Sections 23, 24A.

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Abington Savings Bank
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Atlantic Bank (former)
Avidia Bank
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Bank of America
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Belmont Savings Bank
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Cathay Bank
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Colonial Co-Operative Bank
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Enterprise Bank and Trust
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Fidelity Bank
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Источник: mynewextsetup.us

Randolph Savings to Buy First Federal Savings of Boston

Randolph Savings Bank in Massachusetts has agreed to buy First Eastern Bankshares in Andover, Mass.

The $ million-asset Randolph Savings did not disclose financial terms for the deal, which is expected to close by early

First Eastern is the holding company for the $73 million-asset First Federal Savings Bank of Boston and First Eastern Mortgage. James McDonough, Randolph Savings' chief executive, said in a press release that it is interested in First Eastern, in part, because of its mortgage business.

"A key component of our growth strategy has been investment in our residential lending division," McDonough said.

First Eastern Mortgage has eight mortgage-loan production offices in eastern Massachusetts and services $ million of mortgage loans. After the deal closes, Randolph Savings' said it expects to originate more than $ million yearly in residential mortgage loans.

Peter Fraser, First Eastern's president, will lead Randolph's residential division after the acquisition closes.

First Federal Savings Bank has a branch in Andover.

Randolph Savings Bank, a unit of Randolph Bancorp in Stoughton, Mass., has six branches.

Источник: mynewextsetup.us
first federal savings bank of boston andover ma

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